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This article aims to describe the last 10 years of the collaborative scientific endeavors on
polarization in particular and collective problem-solving in general by our multidisciplinary
research team. We describe the team’s disciplinary composition—social psychology, political
science, social philosophy/epistemology, and complex systems science—highlighting the
shared and unique skill sets of our group members and how each discipline contributes to
studying polarization and collective problem-solving. With an eye to the literature on team
dynamics, we describe team logistics and processes that we believe make our multidisci-
plinary team persistent and productive. We emphasize challenges and difficulties caused by
disciplinary differences in terms of terminology, units/levels of analysis, methodology, and
theoretical assumptions. We then explain how work disambiguating the concepts of polar-
ization and developing an integrative theoretical and methodological framework with com-
plex systems perspectives has helped us overcome these challenges. We summarize the major
findings that our research has produced over the past decade, and describe our current
research and future directions. Last, we discuss lessons we have learned, including difficulties
in a “three models” project and how we addressed them, with suggestions for effective
multidisciplinary team research.
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Polarization is often viewed as one of society’s greatest
ills. Polarization leads to the impediment of communica-
tions between disagreeing groups, the increase of disagree-
ment about facts and interpretations of those facts, the
blurring of the line between facts and opinions, the prolif-
eration of false information within each group, the distrust
between opposing groups, the emergence of radical groups,
and the failure to reach a nationwide consensus on impor-
tant issues, from welfare programs to national security
(Fishkin, 2009; Kavanagh & Rich, 2018; Sunstein, 2002;
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Vallacher, 2015). What causes polarization? How do groups
become radicalized? When do groups reach a consensus?
Can a polarized society be depolarized and integrated?
What can bring segregated groups together again? Does
polarization always have negative consequences in group
functioning?
Over the past decades, different disciplines have ad-
vanced our understanding of polarization remarkably. In
social psychology, group polarization is defined as “the
tendency for group discussion to produce a group decision
or consensual group position that is more extreme than the
mean of individual group members’ prediscussion attitudes
and opinions in the direction already favored by the group”
(Isenberg, 1986, p. 1141, see Hogg, Turner, & Davidson,
1990, for an integrative perspective). It is measured by how
much the average attitude of group members has changed
after group discussion. Different underlying mechanisms of
polarization have been documented in different subfields of
social psychology. For example, polarization can occur
because group members conform to a polarized ingroup
norm, as in social identity theory (Abrams, Wetherell, Co-
chrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). Small group research has
shown that one cause of polarization is that information that
supports the majority opinion is more likely to be shared
(Larson, 1997; Levine & Tindale, 2015; Martin & Hew-
stone, 2008). The attitude change and social influence lit-
erature focuses on how people tend to selectively search for
confirming information (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). In
the social cognition field, researchers have demonstrated
that merely thinking about an attitude object makes the
attitude more extreme and certain (Clarkson, Tormala, &
Leon, 2011; Tesser, 1978).
Political scientists have studied the phenomenon of po-
larization for decades now, most notably comparing popular
versus elite polarization (Hetherington, 2001) and political
versus cultural polarization (Hetherington, 2009). In Fiorina
and Abrams’ review on the subject, they noted that “most
scholars hold an intuitive notion of polarization as a bi-
modal distribution of observations” (Fiorina & Abrams,
2008, p. 566). Although bimodality is the signature marker
of polarization, other more practical measures for polariza-
tion have been carefully deployed such as the spread of
attitudes on an issue (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996),
the homogeneity or issue coherence of distinct groups (Bal-
dassarri & Gelman, 2008), and the kurtosis of the distribu-
tion (i.e., the extremity of observations within a distribu-
tion) of beliefs, attitudes, or policy proposals (Kinder &
Kalmoe, 2017). Different kinds of polarization emerge for
distinctive reasons, but outbidding—where parties have an
incentive to take extreme positions to cater to their party
base—along with media pressures and endogenous law-
making resulting in practices like gerrymandering, all pro-
duce dynamics consonant with the outcomes we observe.
Political scientists have also noted the cultural determinants
of polarization as well, where, as Hetherington and Weiler
(2018) pointed out, Democrats are the party of the Prius
while Republicans are the party of the pickup truck. The
presence (Layman & Green, 2006) and absence (Mason,
2018) of cultural faultlines and cross-cutting cleavages can
explain how political polarization has bled into our cultural
lives as well.
Polarization has been addressed within social epistemol-
ogy through the problem of peer disagreement. Epistemic
peers—people who have equally good perceptual and rea-
soning abilities—may form conflicting beliefs, yet cannot
both be correct. Epistemologists have been debating over
whether and how much belief-revision is rational once peer
disagreement is recognized and peers have had a full chance
to share the support for their respective views. Some argue
that a rational response to disagreement is to reduce confi-
dence in one’s beliefs (Feldman, 2007), whereas others
argue that it can be rational to maintain one’s prior beliefs
(Kelly, 2010). The latter causes polarization (Kelly, 2008).
Finally, in complex systems science, social systems are
understood as complex adaptive systems that are composed
of many parts interacting with one another at different levels
(Miller & Page, 2007). Polarization is a system property that
emerges from multiple complex interactions among agents
over a period of time. Segregation emerges when agents
migrate to neighborhoods where they can be surrounded by
similar agents in terms of ideology, socioeconomic status,
or race and ethnicity (Schelling, 1971). Polarized groups, in
which group members’ opinions are internally homogenous
but differ starkly between groups, emerge in a large society








































































































302 JUNG ET AL.
Building on this mature literature, our multidisciplinary
research team integrated theories and methods from these
four disciplines—social psychology, political science, social
philosophy/epistemology, and complex systems science—to
investigate polarization. Studying polarization requires in-
depth investigation on collective problem-solving and
decision-making as well as social influence and group dy-
namics. In this article, we describe the last 10 years of
collaborative scientific endeavors by our multidisciplinary
research team. First, we highlight how our team composi-
tion helps us better understand polarization. Second, team
dynamics and logistics are described. Third, we address
challenges and difficulties caused by disciplinary differ-
ences in terms of terminology, units/levels of analysis,
methodology, and theoretical assumptions and describe how
we developed an integrative framework to resolve the chal-
lenges. We explain complex systems science and agent-
based modeling as primary methods to integrate theoreti-
cally and methodologically different disciplinary theories of
polarization. Fourth, we highlight some key contributions
that our team research has produced over the past decade,
and describe our current research and future direction. Last,
we discuss lessons we learned from our collaborative work
and offer suggestions for effective multidisciplinary team
research.
Multidisciplinary Team Composition
Social phenomena can hardly be well understood at a
single level of analysis. Social systems are complex, with
multiple levels from individuals through small groups to
large societies. Many factors at different levels interact to
influence one another and different disciplines focus on
different levels of analysis. To have a fuller understanding
of polarization, our team is composed of the scholars of four
different disciplines that are complementary to one another.
Unique Knowledge, Skills, and Approaches
Social psychology employs experiments, an excellent
method to verify causal relations with high internal validity.
It seeks to explain polarization primarily at intraindividual,
interpersonal, and small group levels, such as majority and
minority influence (Crano, 2010; Levine & Tindale, 2015;
Moscovici, 1976), social identity and self-categorization
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987; also see Abrams & Hogg, 2010), social
learning and reinforcement (Bandura, 1977; Skinner, 1938),
and group problem-solving processes (Stasser & Titus,
1985).
Political science provides an understanding of polariza-
tion at both meso- and macrolevels. It focuses on the roles
of social structures and institutions in consensus formation
and opinion polarization, such as voting mechanisms, de-
liberation, hierarchy in representative democracy (Ander-
son, 2006; Marquis de Condorcet 1785/1995; Landemore &
Page, 2015), and political institutions and media (Iyengar &
Hahn, 2009).
Social philosophy/epistemology studies the social dimen-
sions of knowledge—how knowledge and beliefs form, are
contested, consensually validated, and disseminate in epis-
temic communities via social interactions and communica-
tions. It addresses questions regarding whether epistemic
communities can reach truth via rational argumentation and
debate (and if so, how). The aims of social psychology and
political science are descriptive—attempts to describe how
things are. The aims of social epistemology are normative—
attempts to determine what is rational and what shape the
search for knowledge should take.
Finally, complex systems science offers an excellent in-
tegrative theoretical framework and research method that
can establish links from microlevel foundations to mac-
rolevel phenomena, and their cross-level interactions (Ep-
stein, 2007). The integrative approach makes it possible to
test the combinatory effects of multiple interacting factors at
different levels of analysis, to track trajectories of those
effects across time, and to measure macrolevel emergent
consequences.
Shared Skill Sets
Multidisciplinary work can be facilitated by the creation
of “boundary objects” (i.e., artifacts that serve as a common
ground for differing perspectives). Boundary objects serve
to integrate distinct conceptual approaches into a single








































































































munication across disciplinary boundaries (Pennington,
2010). Indeed, upon reflection we suspect that one key to
our group’s success is a shared commitment to agent-based
modeling. While agent-based modeling is not inherently
multidisciplinary, given that we had a multidisciplinary
group, we think that having a shared methodology facili-
tated communication and obviated a number of issues that
have been reported to cause problems (O’Rourke & Crow-
ley, 2013). While each member of the group is “conversa-
tional” in modeling, some team members (Bramson, Grim,
and Singer) are truly experts in the construction of compu-
tation models and typically take the lead in the building
phase. In contrast, more empirically oriented members
(Berger, Jung, Kovaka, and Holman) bring the models in
contact with the empirical literatures in their respective
disciplines. Yet this crude partition obscures the fact that
every member connects the models with work in their
discipline.
Given a common language, our breadth of expertise al-
lows the group to survey a wide scope of literatures that
speak to the same conceptual terrain, but that often remain
siloed in their respective disciplines. Although we can iden-
tify a political scientist (William Berger), a social psychol-
ogist (Jiin Jung), epistemologists (Patrick Grim, Daniel J.
Singer, Bennett Holman, and Karen Kovaka), and a com-
plex systems scientist (Aaron Bramson) in our team, no
researcher can be defined by a single discipline. All have
multidisciplinary backgrounds. The knowledge background
of our team members encompasses a wide, diverse range of
disciplines—biology, cognitive science, complex systems
science, developmental and clinical psychology, epistemol-
ogy, geosciences, mathematics, social psychology, political
science, philosophy, and statistics. As we have built up our
understanding of polarization and collective problem-
solving, members have been interested in understanding
what aspects of the phenomena are grasped in alternative
conceptualizations.
Team Dynamics and Logistics
Many multidisciplinary teams form, but they often fade
away. In this section, we describe team logistics and pro-
cesses that we think have made our team productive and
persistent, integrating our reflections into the existent liter-
ature on the science of team science and innovation (for
reviews, see Hall et al., 2018; Thayer, Petruzzelli, & Mc-
Clurg, 2018).
Weekly Research Meetings and Information
Sharing
Suh and Shin (2010) have found that, particularly for
geographically dispersed research teams, regular meetings
are crucial to maintaining continuing participation. Our
group has been meeting almost every week for nine years
and we believe these weekly meetings have been critical to
the team’s persistent productivity. Though we are now quite
dispersed, as with many other successful collaborations, our
group began at a single institution (Freeman, Ganguli, &
Murciano-Goroff, 2014)—The Center for the Study of
Complex Systems at the University of Michigan. Accord-
ingly, our initial research meetings were face-to-face, but as
many team members moved to other states or countries, we
began video conferencing. While we generally meet around
10 a.m. (Eastern Standard Time) later in the week, we
renegotiate the meeting time every semester. One of the
remarkable aspects of the group is its continuity given its
members being located in anywhere from three to five time
zones at a given time. (The most radical case was one
summer in which members were in Seoul, South Korea;
Ghent, Belgium; Anchorage, Alaska; Claremont, Califor-
nia; Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
Dedication and flexibility are often required. Research
agendas are provided via e-mail a couple days before each
meeting. After the meeting, agendas are summarized and
shared via e-mail. We use Dropbox to share research-related
information (literature, models, data, etc.). We believe these
technologies help our team function efficiently.
Open Mindset, Trust, and Skepticism
Multidisciplinary communication can be difficult due to
disciplinary differences in constructs, assumptions, and re-
search cultures. However, these issues have not been par-
ticularly problematic in our team. One possible explanation
is that we have created an environment that promotes team







































































































304 JUNG ET AL.
Hoover, Chudoba, and Watson-Manheim (2015) have found
that open-minded environments in which individuals could
develop trust, promoted innovative outcomes. We approach
our interactions with a very open mindset that (tries to) hear
critical feedback as helpful. However, unlike the supportive
and receptive communication identified by Crowston et al.
(2015), many of our discussions are driven by skepticism:
someone proposes an idea and others try to shoot it down.
This is a tough way to interact with people, especially if you
do not know their intention and trust that they ultimately are
trying to be helpful. It might also be worth noting that this
might make our group interactions seem somewhat hostile
to an outsider. Accordingly, efforts are made to explain the
value of this approach to new members: we have found by
experience that the ideas and arguments that can withstand
our own skepticism are much more likely to hold up to peer
review and, we hope, simply be better-formed ideas and
arguments.
First Draft Writing
Each project has a lead author who is in charge of coor-
dinating work on the paper. Generally, very early on in the
project the lead writes a first draft of the paper and shares it
with other members. While much of this draft may ulti-
mately be discarded or replaced, we think it is usually the
initial brainstorming phase when a project fails to move
forward because people have too many different thoughts
about how a particular topic might be developed. Having a
lead on the project write up a first draft clarifies its focus,
and the team can move onto the execution phase.
Project Development and Task Divisions
We do not have members who dictate topics and research
technique. When we are ready for a new project, we hold
a series of brainstorming sessions. If a consensus finds a
proposal interesting, the team starts working on the proj-
ect. Proposals generally fall in the domain of collective
problem-solving and decision making, collective knowl-
edge formation and change, and polarization.
Cummings and Kiesler (2007) found that creating sub-
groups to work on different aspects of a project was crucial,
especially for multiuniversity teams. We have found this to
be true, so long as the project also has a lead (see the “three
models” section below for a description of the problems that
arose with a less hierarchical structure). Typically, the lead
is the person who proposed the project. The leader is in
charge of writing drafts, leading debates on the topic during
research meetings, and handling journal submissions. Dur-
ing the project, the leader is also in charge of identifying
what needs to be done, but group members volunteer for
what tasks they are willing to take on. This is typically
sufficient to keep projects moving. This transition from the
open-ended and egalitarian brainstorming phase of projects
to the more leader-driven main phase of the project may
well be a good example of how our group has learned to
manage the conflicting demands of innovation and imple-
mentation (Thayer et al., 2018).
After a decade of collaboration, team members are well
aware of each other’s expertise and skill sets. Based on this
well-developed transactive memory (Wegner, 1986, 1995),
our team members organically take on tasks that suit their
expertise. The development of such collective familiarity is
a benefit of long-running teams that has been shown to
increase group effectiveness (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, &
Gilson, 2008).
Occasionally, individual members have been seen to be
failing to pull their weight, but these incidences are dealt
with directly and respectfully by the group leader contacting
the individual, explaining the situation, and confirming that
the member is still committed to participating in the group.
Depending on their priorities, members can recommit to
contributing to the group or choose not to be part of future
projects. Our policy on credit sharing goes a long way to
inspire group commitment and group cohesiveness.
Credit Sharing
Collaborative problem-solving can be promoted by en-
suring that rewards accrue to the team rather than specific
individuals (Kramer, Thayer, & Salas, 2013). We think it
has been important for our group operation that credit was
always spread around, and always shared. The understand-
ing was that everyone operative in a project would appear as
an author, with order by consensus on contribution level.








































































































one was taking individual credit for work developed collab-
oratively. Individuals have always been encouraged to pres-
ent group work with the understanding that prominent credit
would be given to all participants in the group work on
which it was built. Group norms are sufficiently flexible that
members are allowed and even encouraged to publish
follow-up papers, with or without collective attribution.
While credit does in some sense lead every group member
to pitch in their time, the overriding lack of egotism in the
group is a cornerstone of its harmony and success, allowing
for individuals to pursue their own work, even when
grounded in that of the group.
Casual Research Environment
The amount of pressure that a group is under is a con-
textual factor that moderates group dynamics (Salas, Shuf-
fler, Thayer, Bedwell, & Lazzara, 2015). In this regard, our
collaboration is a low-stakes environment, because each
member has independent projects that are primary to their
research agenda. None of us is solely dependent on the
success of the group. Team projects can inspire our inde-
pendent projects and vice versa. While Van Mierlo and
Kleingeld (2010) find that high-stakes environments lead to
higher degrees of risk taking, we find that this low-stakes
research environment allows us to be flexible and to pursue
research topics that we genuinely think important and in-
teresting.
A Sense of Academic Freedom
Lastly, we think our collaboration provides us a sense of
academic freedom. Disciplines usually have their own way
of viewing, interpreting, and analyzing the world and prob-
lems within it. Compartmentalized scientific communities
can facilitate clear communication and intensely focused
research, but can limit the breadth of research. Collabora-
tion is an opportunity for us to be able to learn new knowl-
edge developed by other disciplines, incorporate it with
knowledge we are familiar with, and conduct research that
cannot be easily done within-discipline. We believe this
sense of academic freedom makes us genuinely enjoy the
team research, and it motivates us to continue this collab-
orative endeavor. Beyond this freedom, however, the group
fosters a collegial climate of genuine curiosity. Members are
friendly with one another (often teasing each other on calls)
and strongly motivated by intellectual playfulness. This
curiosity is the bedrock of the group’s mode of operation.
Valuing the strengths of other disciplines and openness to
explore new topics outside members’ respective areas of
expertise have been shown to facilitate multidisciplinary
work (Vogel et al., 2014) and it is both why many of us
were drawn to the group and one reason we think that we
have been successful.
Overcoming the Challenges of
Conceptual Ambiguity
Disambiguation of Polarization Concepts
Numerous writers on multidisciplinary work have noted
that conflicting uses of central terminology can cause dif-
ficulty (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013; Vogel et al., 2014).
Our team found that this problem could be transformed into
an important project in its own right. In the process of
reviewing the literature for our own model of social polariza-
tion, we were immediately struck by the variety of conceptual,
terminological, and mathematical differences among authors
in simply defining polarization. In some cases, multiple
concepts were invoked within a single paper without differ-
entiation. In some cases, polarization meant approximating
a bimodal distribution; in others, it referred to the distinct-
ness of identified groups; and in yet others, it referred to the
variety of held beliefs. Our project turned away from our
own computational model and into sorting out the various
phenomena called polarization into distinct concepts.
We elucidated nine senses of polarization with corre-
sponding formal measures to demonstrate their distinctness.
Five of the measures were based on the distribution of the
whole population (spread, dispersion, converge, regional-
ization, and community fragmentation), whereas four mea-
sures were based on inter- and intragroup distributions
(distinctness, group divergence, group consensus, and size
parity; Bramson et al., 2016, 2017; Grim et al., 2012, 2014).
These nine senses of polarization depend only on features of
the distributions and are thus remarkably germane to a wide








































































































306 JUNG ET AL.
The first work was primarily conceptual, with formal
measures only playing a clarifying role. We next applied our
collection of measures to topics previously identified as
polarizing by the General Social Survey dataset—specifi-
cally to questions on political views, religiosity, and abor-
tion attitudes of the U.S. population from 1984 to 2012. We
found that some cases of scholarly disagreement over
whether Americans are polarized were driven by research-
ers invoking different concepts/measures of polarization.
For example, attitudes on abortion maintain a clear bimo-
dality that other ideological issues do not exhibit. Our
expanded set of precise polarization concepts and measures
brings greater clarity to discussions of polarization. These
variants could not be identified using previous patchwork
measures of polarization, and a more nuanced view of
similarities and differences has implications for articulating
system dynamics across disciplines.
Epistemic Success and Convergence
The various concepts of polarization bring with them
corresponding concepts of convergence. Opinions converg-
ing at distinct points constitutes polarization while opinions
converging at a central consensus constitutes the antithesis
of polarization. At this point in our research, we went on to
use that concept of consensus as one of two criteria in
evaluating the functionality of collective problem-solving in
general (Grim, Singer, et al., 2013). Convergence is whether
and how quickly people in an epistemic community form a
consensus from diverse views; epistemic success measures
whether collective problem-solving achieves a correct an-
swer (see, e.g., Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Mason, Jones, &
Goldstone, 2008; Zollman, 2012). An emphasis on the latter
concept in addition to the former eventually led us beyond
our initial focus on polarization in particular to a wider
modeling of social exploration and problem-solving in gen-
eral.
Agent-Based Complex Systems Modeling
We discussed research methods that can integrate multi-
disciplinary theories and the multilevel factors that are
involved in collective problem-solving and polarization.
Agent-based, complex systems models are simulated mul-
tiagent systems in which multiple agents interact with each
other simultaneously over time. Agents follow a few simple
contingency rules. System-level properties emerge from a
single rule, or combinations of different rules. This meth-
odology is beneficial for conducting multidisciplinary re-
search because it can establish the cross-level links between
microlevel psychological mechanisms and macrolevel
group polarization phenomena and can formalize cross-
level interaction effects (Davis, O’Mahony, Gulden, Osoba,
& Sieck, 2018). Similarly, Epstein (2008) pointed out that
models can be the focal points of teams involving experts
from many disciplines because researchers can incorporate
the best domain expertise in a rigorous way. Furthermore,
while assumptions often vary across different disciplines
and theories, modeling forces researchers to make those
assumptions explicit, reducing miscommunication and fa-
cilitating a rigorous study of their consequences.
Primary Research Contributions
Memes Versus Genes Versus Germs: Comparing
Information-Transfer Mechanisms
One research project toward building a common ground-
work aimed to investigate how memes as an epistemologi-
cal information unit spread differently from germs and
genes as epidemiological and genetic information units
(Grim, Singer, Fisher, & Reade, 2015; Grim, Reade, Singer,
Fisher, & Majewicz, 2010). We built the information trans-
fer model for three kinds of information (i.e., germs, genes,
and memes). Genes coded in DNA pass though reproduc-
tion networks. Germs contain genetic information in RNA
and DNA that is spread through contact and infection.
Memes carry propositional information and are transferred
through learning and reinforcement on social communica-
tion networks. Simulation results indicate that the spread of
memes is sensitive to the degree of linkage between sub-
networks, whereas the spread of germs is sensitive to net-
work structures. The spread of genes is robust across dif-
ferent network structures and subnetwork linkage patterns.
Our work implies that there may be optimal community








































































































between different communities can expedite collective
problem-solving and consensual knowledge formation. The
results suggest that public health interventions should focus
not only on epidemiological networks of contagion but on
health-related information networks as well.
Belief Polarization in Different Ethnic
Communities
Next, we turned our attention to the real social problem of
health care information disparity between different ethnic
groups (Grim, Thomas, et al., 2013). Information networks
can vary between different ethnic communities, as can lev-
els of trust in information from different sources. Thus,
information about health and health care can also spread
differently in different racial and ethnic communities. We
particularly focused on a situation when information from a
governmental source (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention) is conflicting with information from religious
sources (church or religious leaders). We used empirical
data from the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health
Survey to construct health information networks for White
and Black communities. White communities had a dense
network with more connections to family and friends, and
distrust of religious sources was prominent among those
who have many informational connections with family and
friends. Black communities had a sparse information net-
work with fewer connections to family and friends. In black
communities, a distrust of family, friends, and the govern-
ment (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) was
more widespread among those who were isolated in the
network.
Using our empirically driven networks with varying de-
grees of connections and trust levels, we constructed atti-
tude update algorithms informed by social psychological
rules of social influence (i.e., people change their health
beliefs by social influence from whom they trust), and
implemented the algorithms in a network dynamic model.
We explored how the structure of the information network
and inputs from different sources affect the belief configu-
ration of the community over time. Simulation results
showed different dynamic patterns of belief polarization in
two communities when governmental sources and religious
sources disagree. In the Black community, health-related
beliefs became extremely polarized such that some com-
pletely endorse governmental information while others
completely endorse information from religious sources. In
the White community, most people came to hold centrist or
extreme beliefs favoring governmental information, with
only a small number of people completely endorsing reli-
gious sources. Public health care interventions can use these
belief dynamics to optimize information flow across differ-
ent ethnic communities.
Social Structures for Collective Epistemic Success
Once we realized the importance of network structures in
belief dynamics from our empirically driven health infor-
mation network study described above, we continued to
investigate which social network structures are more effi-
cient in achieving epistemic success for problems with an
objectively correct answer (e.g., health care information,
legal problems). We modeled different network structures
of epistemic communities ranging from decentralized net-
works (ring or small world), through random and regular
lattices, to highly centralized and completely connected
networks (Grim, Singer, et al., 2013, p. 20, Figure 6).
Simulation results indicated that a society is more likely to
achieve epistemic successes when its communication net-
work is decentralized as in a small world or ring rather than
highly centralized or completely connected. Although ref-
erencing and stimulated by work in other disciplines—
specifically, Mason et al. (2008) in psychology, Cangelosi
and Parisi (2002) in computational linguistics, Lazer and
Friedman (2007) in administrative science, and a variety of
sources in biology and epidemiology—our work in this
regard was most clearly set in the context of contemporary
work in computational philosophy (e.g., Zollman, 2012)
akin to work in economics (Bala & Goyal, 1998), computer
science and information theory (Kleinberg, 2001).
Next, we turned to subjective problems in which epis-
temic success is defined by when a collective decision
correctly reflects the majority’s opinion. We developed a
model grounded in political science—the Condorcet jury
theorem for a democratic voting process, and Hong and







































































































308 JUNG ET AL.
cratic debate process. Then, we explored whether two dem-
ocratic processes (voting and/or debate) would successfully
reflect the majority’s opinion in a representative hierarchy
similar to that possessed by most advanced modern demo-
cratic countries. We modeled various opinion pooling rules,
from a direct democracy in which collective decisions are
made by majority rule to a representative democracy in
which collective decisions are made by elected officials
representing a group of people (Grim et al., in press).
Simulation results indicated that when collective decisions
are made solely by a vote, direct majority voting is episte-
mologically superior to a representational structure. How-
ever, when collective decisions require discussion, deliber-
ation among representatives has identical or slightly superior
results to full deliberation among all participants.
Social Influence, Diversity, and Polarization
We have recently turned our focus to more sophisticated
microlevel psychological processes. We extensively re-
viewed the social influence literature in the field of social
psychology and modeled the contemporary theory of ma-
jority and minority influences using an agent-based model
(Jung & Bramson, 2014, 2016; Jung, Bramson, & Crano,
2018). Simulations revealed that in the face of a strong
conformity force toward the majority, indirect minority
influence can spread a nascent idea to the whole society and
change the status quo as long as group members have a high
internal consistency drive.
In political science and other social scientific fields, ran-
dom errors have been considered as an important source for
diversity in a society (Bednar, Bramson, Jones-Rooy, &
Page, 2010) as well as social change (Nowak & Lewenstein,
1996). We incorporated the random error process within our
model and compared two mechanisms in terms of their
consequences in diversity and polarization of opinions and
the magnitude, speed, and frequency of social change. Sim-
ulation results indicate that both indirect minority influence
and random errors produce social change and diversity, but
with different patterns of complexity. With introducing ran-
dom errors, a group has a small but persistent minority and
goes through rare, but rapid and radical social change from
one extreme to the other. With indirect minority influence,
a group has persistent equally sized majority and minority
factions, and all agents have uniquely different attitude
compositions; social change occurs frequently but gradually
and within a moderate range (Jung, Page, & Miller, 2017;
Jung, Page, Miller, Bramson, & Crano, 2018).
Finally, we investigated the combinatory effects of dif-
ferent influence sources on polarization and consensus: (a)
word-of-mouth, (b) deliberative groups, and (c) polarized
media (Pulick, Korth, Grim, & Jung, 2016). We adapted
schedules of reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner, 1957) to a
computational model. We found that with varying rein-
forcement levels media influence alone polarizes public
opinion whereas under group deliberation alone it con-
verges to the center. Media influence and group deliberation
interact to form public consensus not at the center but at one
extreme.
Polarization via Rational Responses
In the social sciences and philosophy, belief polarization
is typically viewed as a consequence of epistemic irratio-
nality. Among social psychologists, the most popular views
attribute polarization to biased evaluation and assimilation
of evidence (see Lord et al., 1979), motivated reasoning
(Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009), individuals wanting to
maintain their social identity in a group (Abrams et al.,
1990), or attempts to avoid uncertainty (Gaffney, Rast,
Hackett, & Hogg, 2014; Sherman, Hogg, & Maitner, 2009).
In all of these cases, the factors that create polarization are
not the sort of thing that can epistemically justify or ratio-
nalize agents’ beliefs, so polarization is treated as a product
of epistemic irrationality. To model how polarization might
arise, we developed a model that takes inspiration from the
hidden profile paradigm (Sohrab, Waller, & Kaplan, 2015;
Stasser & Titus, 2003) from social psychology. Using a
computational model, we can experiment with the full range
of behavior-generating mechanisms, from completely ratio-
nal agents to completely irrational agents. It would be
difficult, or even impossible, to study this topic with human
subjects.
In our model, agents can hold a limited number of argu-
ments (e.g., a maximum of seven arguments; Miller, 1956)
for or against some conclusion. Some arguments are shared
and others are unique to individual agents. Each argument
has a weight, which specifies how strongly it counts in favor
or against the conclusion. An agent’s belief is modeled as
the sum of their argument weights. There are two key
differences between our model and the hidden profile
model. First, in our model the set of all arguments held by
agents at a particular time point is only part of the whole set
of arguments. This means that some arguments may never
be discovered. In the hidden profile model, on the other
hand, what is supported by all the information is always
accessible if all group members successfully pool all the
information and sort out the information among them. We
believe this aspect of our paradigm better represents social
epistemic processes in reality where a group may not have
the information necessary to reach a correct answer even
when they pool all the information they hold. Second, in our
model each argument has a continuously valued weight
indicating argument quality, whereas in the hidden profile
model each piece of information is simply either relevant or
irrelevant to problem-solving.
In our simpler simulations, in each round of the group







































































































argument is heard by all the other agents in the group (i.e.,
there is perfect communication). Because agents have a
limited memory, they need to forget one argument after they
receive a new argument via group discussion. We tested
three ways of forgetting: (a) forgetting randomly, where
agents forget a randomly chosen argument; (b) forgetting
the weakest argument, where agents forget their weakest
argument regardless of what it supports; and (c) forgetting
the weakest opposing argument, where agents forget the
weakest argument that opposes their all-things-considered
belief. When agents have limited memories and forget ran-
domly or forget the weakest argument, the group always
reaches a consensus. However, when agents with limited
memories forget the weakest opposing argument, the group
almost never converges and two subgroups emerge. We
found similar results when agents are allowed to get argu-
ments from outside of the group in addition to internal
group discussion.
By appeal to the philosophical literature, we show that
forgetting the weakest opposing argument does not have the
features that make biased evaluation and assimilation irra-
tional. We then give two arguments that show that this
method is a rational way to manage one’s memory (for the
extensive epistemological discussion, see Section 4 of
Singer et al., 2018). It follows that groups of agents can
become polarized in virtue of everyone acting rationally in
response to new incoming information.
Lessons Learned
Balance Between Sciences and Humanities
A lesson we learned is that a team’s disciplinary compo-
sition and open-mindedness to different disciplinary as-
sumptions are important, but that what is really critical for
successful and effective multidisciplinary research practice
on this kind of topic is the balance between the sciences and
the humanities. Three scientific disciplines help us under-
stand the way things are. Social psychology provides mi-
crofoundations of polarization. Political science provides
meso- and macrolevel explanations. Complex systems sci-
ence provides an excellent integrative framework both the-
oretically and methodologically. Science describes the so-
cial and physical world, but does not tell us how we should
interpret and apply scientific knowledge to societies. That is
where the humanities come in. Social philosophy and epis-
temology provide normative guidelines for our scientific
research. In this vein, the team focuses on understanding
that combinations of individuals’ cognitive mechanisms and
social structures can lead to epistemologically healthy so-
cieties.
A Core Group and a Fuzzy Boundary
A mix of strong and weak ties in research groups has been
shown to generate a productive balance between exploration
and exploitation in scientific research (Wang, 2016). We
agree and believe that the reason that our team has been able
to conduct its multidisciplinary research continuously, ef-
fectively, and creatively is that we have a core group with a
fuzzy boundary. Having core members who are committed
to the team is critical for its viability. After years of weekly
meetings and discussions, researchers in the same team
come to build a similar knowledge base. To some degree,
this makes communication and research efficient. But it also
can make a team environment stagnant and less creative.
Although the team has core members who are strongly
committed to collaborate in pursuing our research pro-
grams, both graduate and undergraduate students have made
important contributions before moving onto other paths
(Steven Fisher, Carissa Flocken, Sean McGeehan, Anika
Ranginani, Christopher Reade, and Graham Sack). There is
no demand that collaborators commit for the long-haul.
When new members have joined permanently or tempo-
rarily for some projects, we have experienced definite ef-
fects on both team climate and knowledge. First, while we
brief a new member, we sometimes discover pieces of
important information that have been neglected. Second,
when a new member brings a new perspective, a new frame,
and new knowledge to the group, old-timers adopt a diver-
gent thinking style and are able to view problem spaces
from broader perspectives. Also, the group sometimes
adopts novel directions of research suggested by new mem-
bers, which keeps the group fresh and interesting.
Three Models Project
Not all of our collaboration has been equally successful,
nor have all of our projects had a smooth development. Here
too lessons have been learned. The work that ultimately
appeared as Bramson et al. (2016) and Bramson et al.
(2017) was originally conceived as a “three models project,”
in which three prominent formal models of polarization
(Axelrod, 1997; Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Macy, Kitts,
Flache, & Benard, 2003) were compared in terms of the
specific patterns of opinion distribution they were and were
not capable of producing, particularly with an eye to em-
pirical results in the psychological literature (e.g., Lord et
al., 1979). We assigned the writing of separate sections on
each of the three models to three different subteams, with all
collaborating on the general introduction. The result was an
unwieldy and uncoordinated patchwork, a result immedi-
ately evident to all and a source of frustrated chagrin. The
models at issue were so different that our disparate sub-
teams had taken radically different approaches in different
sections, emphasizing radically different features. Only
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from Aaron Bramson, were we able to integrate our efforts.
The lesson we have learned is that the apparent efficiency of
dividing a paper into separate sections by different team
members can compromise and undermine the benefits of
full synchronous collaboration and communication on all
aspects of a project throughout its development.
Future Directions and Empirical Validation
Our current model of rational polarization demonstrates
how polarization might arise from rational information pro-
cessing. Building from it, we plan to include other param-
eters into the model—path dependence, sharedness of argu-
ments (majority or minority), diversity (Grim et al., 2019, in
press), comparative contexts (intergroup and intra group),
issue types (subjective or objective), hierarchical repre-
sentation, and interaction communities (communication
across social networks). This model and its associated
extensions aim to shed light on the continuing political
polarization in American politics. The national (Hopkins,
2018), cultural (Hetherington & Weiler, 2018), and repre-
sentational (Broockman & Skovron, 2018) polarization of
politics hinge on the kind of underlying dynamics that we
hope to account for. Indeed, as Levendusky (2010) and
Ahler and Broockman (2018) showed, not all polarization is
bad, and in fact may, under some conditions, increase the
representative merits of the political system.
Our approach offers novel insights into the field of social
psychology. Most previous studies in attitude change and
persuasion focus mainly on changes in general attitude
when people are exposed to strong or weak persuasive
messages, rather than the specific arguments involved. It is
still unknown how people update their arguments and which
arguments they would retain or discard. A series of exper-
iments can be conducted to explicate how and when people
update their arguments for a particular attitudinal topic
during group discussion and debate, and how such argument
updates influence overall attitude and belief.
Our recent project about forgetting process and polariza-
tion has inspired psychological studies conducted by the
social psychologist member of our team. For example, her
recently published paper on jury discussion indicates that
group discussion can affect not only information presented
during the discussion, but also information presented after
the discussion (Kerr & Jung, 2018). Whether and how the
recency effect of group discussion would cause polarization
remains as a future research question.
Concluding Remarks
There have been increasing demands for more multidis-
ciplinary research in scientific communities. Because dif-
ferent disciplines have been building their own system of
knowledge for a long time on their own disciplinary as-
sumptions and with their own vocabulary, multidisciplinary
communication, not to mention multidisciplinary research,
is inherently difficult. Emphasizing open-mindedness is im-
portant but not enough. We believe that it is important to
have an agreement on what integrative framework a team
wants to take. We also believe the right balance between the
sciences and the humanities is critical if the goals of the
team are to solve real-world problems and to contribute to a
better and healthier society.
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